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Mental Imagery, Psychology, and Rhetoric :
An Examination of Recurring Problems
Linda T. Calendrillo

A composing theories and practices. However, mental imagery in our field is

s writing specialists we often cross into p s ychology to inform our

not fully recognized as an area of inquiry from which to draw our theories. This
is a mistake for those of us interested in enhancing our thinking about writing
from the fullest possible range of disciplines. But this neglect is not surprising.
Research into mental imagery is fraught with debate over its nature and the
legitimacy of studying it. Indeed, by examining the parallels between the
c o ntemporary debate in p s y c h o l o g y and the c l a s s i c a l rhetorical d e b ate
surrounding the use of the mnemonic image, I show that the marginalizing of
mental imagery in rhetorical theory and pedagogy is an old phenomenon.
In this article I look at the conceptual problems psychologists face as they
describe, test, and apply mental imagery to show that we can trace similar problems
in rhetorical history. I look at the contemporary debate between the pictorialists
those who believe mental images are like photographs in the mind-and the
descriptionalists-those who hold that mental images represent ideas or sentences in
the mind (Finke, 1 989; Pinker & Kosslyn, 1983; Tye, 1 984).
Let me summarize the problems that psychologists discuss when they
describe empirical difficulties in experimenting with mental imagery. Ronald
Finke ( 1 9 89) in Principles of Mental Images isolates what he sees as two basic
problems i n studying mental imagery. Finke says mental images are first,
subj ective and second, elusive. Their subjectivity comes from their idiosyncratic
nature (different individuals will image a bird differently), and so researchers
have difficulty testing mental images (they cannot insure that the images they
are comparing are in fact comparable, which leads researchers to fear inaccurate
results) . The mental images are also elusive (one person's bird may last longer as
a mental representation than the next person's, and when the subj ect tries to
regain the bird image, she or he may find a different bird or no bird at all ) . These
difficulties make imagery research, Finke says, controversial.
These concerns resemble the classical disagreement on the v i ability of
mental imagery as a mnemonic device. This debate hinges on the utility of the
loci mnemonic, an imagery-based mnemonic art consisting of a series of mental
images an individual imposes on memory to enhance the recall of information.
The individual forms unusual and violent images and stores them in a sequence
of previously selected holding places in the mind. For example, to remember five
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name s , a person might image each i n d i v i d u a l w i th various bru i s e s in a
separate room in the person's home. This strategy for layering images , called the
loci mnemonic, was embraced by Cicero ( 1 948) in De Oratore as a longstanding
and highly regarded mnemonic, but was rejected by Quintilian ( 1 922) in his
Institutio Oratoria a century later. Though the loci strategy was taught and used
consistently through the Middle Ages, Quintilian's attack on it made its presence
circumspect. Quintilian 's argument against the loci mnemonic included some of
the same strictures that Finke pinpoints as inhibiting mental imagery research
today. Although Quintilian provided a clear description and analys i s of the
imaging strategy, he declared it overly complicated and unteachable, saying, in
fact, "My precepts . . . will be of a simpler kind" (p. 227). We are given to under
stand that since the loci method was difficult to recreate, to track, and, as
Quintilian believed, to teach, its value was suspect. At best, it was appropriate
for remembering long lists of names but otherwise an incumbrance. Indeed,
because it relied on a solitary learner, the loci did not lend itself to the rote
memorizing that Quintilian favored. In part, the medieval use of alphabet books,
commonplace books listing prescribed images for each corresponding letter,
reflected a retreat from independent images. This same disregard of the loci as
unteachable was repeated by Geoffrey of Vinsauf ( 1 97 1 ) in the early thirteenth
century when he said, "Tully [Cicero] relies on a theory of exotic images , which
it i s well to remember; but he i s teaching himself and is, as it were, the sole
devotee of his subtle system which i s of a subtlety unique to himself" (p. 1 05).
Quintilian ( 1 922) also foreshadowed the debate on the nature of the image
that i s argued by the pictorialists and descriptionalists. As a descriptionalist,
Quintilian believed that images were simply metaphoric representations of ideas
and language which he did not believe could be adequately visualized. Quintilian,
in analyzing the loci mnemonic, worried that words would be lost or confused as
images replaced them in individuals' mind. He argued against using the loci strat
egy to help remember texts: "How can such an art grasp a whole series of con
nected words?" (p. 225). In fact, he saw the method as a hindrance to a rhetor:
"Will not the flow of our speech inevitably be impeded by the double task im
posed on our memory?" (p. 227). This double task i s translating words into im
ages and then retranslating them back into words. Quintilian feared that the rhetor
would be unable to translate some words, a decidedly descriptionalist perspec
tive. He also feared that the images when recalled later for linguistic transcrip
tion would not accurately match the words that triggered the image. Quintilian ' s
position, which valued the verbal over the visual, ignored Cicero ' s contention
that images were more vivid and more easily recalled than words.
Research methodologies today create difficulty for those examining mental
imagery, b y muddying research results and complicating discussions. When
testing memory strategies, psychologists often investigate the classical directive
to use bizarre or violent images to enhance recall (Rollins, 1 989; Riefer, 1 992).
This particular component of the classical imagery mnemonic (Rhetorica ad
Herennium, 1 95 4 ) has been studied broadly in psychology, perhaps i n part
because it allows for a relatively straightforward empirical design that measures
whether or not exotic images are recalled more easily than neutral images (Riefer,
1 9 9 2 ) . To e s t a b l i s h t h i s e m p i r i c a l d e s i g n , r e s earchers n e e d o n l y g i v e
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directions for storing images that differ in their description of the nature of the
image (one group gets bizarre/violent, while the other does not) . Researchers
have tested this principle with uneven results (Richardson, 1 98 7 ; Rollins, 1 989).
In memory research that examines the loci mnemonic, this empirical design also
recurs, with often inconclusive or contradictory results.
Studying violent images may in itself be problematic in contemporary
Western culture. If subjects used for these tests are desensitized to unusual im
ages in the films they watch or the news they see, the classical prescription for
those images may not be effective for them. I make this suggestion in part based
on the work of John Richardson, a psychologist who questions the research
methods used in memory work. In his 1 987 critique "Social Class Limitations on
the Efficacy of Imagery Mnemonic Instructions," Richardson suggests that the
socio-economic backgrounds of the typical research subjects (college students)
skew the results of that research. These subjects, he argues, are empowered by
social class and believe themselves capable of performing well on such tests, are
empowered to learn, and c o n s equently may u s e learned s trate g i e s more
effectively than those from less privileged backgrounds. Richardson ' s critique of
memory testing can apply to the bizarreness tests. Would Riefer and Rouder 's
study ( 1 992) have yielded the same results had their subjects not been University
of California-Irvine students? Richardson encourages us to doubt the ability to
generalize from these and the results of other studies.
Major shifts in the treatment of the image, I believe, began in Western culture
during the Middle Ages. We again see something of a fringe science when imagery
was relegated to the status of memory enhancer to help Christians adhere to virtue
and avoid vice (Carruthers, 1 990; Yates, 1 966). To claim that imagery was used
during this extended period to teach illiterate people religious principles is an
oversimplification, but a useful one. The architecture of the times used statuary ex
tensively to represent virtue and condemn vice, especially in its cathedrals. Relics
that were valued as talismans of goodness and power were housed in containers that
recreated the artifact in some fashion. A fragment of St. Louis's jaw, for example, is
enclosed in a gold bust in Paris's Cathedral of Notre Dame. Symbolizing the relic this
way reminds viewers of its strength and its material wealth and of the value of living
virtuously. The notion that illiteracy necessitated the iconography of the Christian
faith may be partially responsible for the devaluing of the mental image in a literate
culture. If words are preferred as efficient codes of thought and if images are tied to
lower class illiterate cultures, then valuing images reveals social class and ignores
literacy as a status symbol.
In contemporary thinking, mental imagery, even when discussed by those
who support its validity, is often described in preliterate terms as well. For
example, Finke ( 1 990), in Creative Imagery: Discoveries and Inventions in Visu
alization, endorses using mental imagery as a "preinventive form," an almost
primitive term which Finke uses to identify "the products of combinational play
of visualization" (p. 3), wherein individuals form, combine, and manipulate im
ages in ways we might call a prose invention strategy. This view of the mental
image is also reflected in Flower and Haye s ' s ( 1 984) "Images, Plans, and Prose,"
in which non-verbal imagery i s listed as a preconscious form of cognition along
with structural relationships and procedural knowledge. In a chapter of his book
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called "Imagery on the Bounds of Cognition," Mark Rollins ( 1 989) tells us that
"a theory of mental i magery can elucidate a range of i s sues from animal
cognition to artistic creation" (p. 1 3 2). Though Rollins' statement does not
intend to disparage mental imagery, I am struck by the marginalizing language
he chooses. Mental imagery as a mode of thinking i s something done by dogs and
artists; medievally, thinking in images was something done by the uneducated,
and only those on the fringe of our field seem to be studying or endorsing its use.
When we begin to look at where in composition studies the use of mental
imagery is most often cited, we see continued neglect. Mental imagery is used by
some cognitive psychologists in a range of applications: to solve problems, think
creatively, and enhance memory; in psychotherapy mental imaging is used to
reduce stress and combat phobias; and in athletic training to improve physical
performance. Yet, currently mental imagery i s not seriously considered by most
mainstream composition theorists as a viable component of the process. It i s an
area of concern within NCTE' s Assembly for Expanded Perspectives on Learn
ing (AEPL), established in large part by Alice Brand and Richard Graves. This
concern is further endorsed in Brand and Grave ' s Presence of Mind, which
includes essays on mental imagery. But apart from its inclusion in the work of
AEPL, what little work i s being done in mental imagery is in technical writing.
Though this application represents a beginning, it unwittingly reinforces some of
the same marginalizing of mnemonic imagery strategies of the ancient Roman
rhetoricians. In an article, "Using Visual Mnemonics to Make Instructions Easier
to Remember," in the Journal of Technical Writing and Communication, for in
stance, Hirst ( 1 990) endorses visual mnemonics but does so in a way that contra
dicts both the principles of the clas sical loci mnemonic and contemporary
psychological thinking. However, this treatment i s in keeping with the spirit of
medieval imagery.
Though Hirst cites the work of contemporary imagery psychologists and
memory researchers, along with the class ical mnemonic imagery strategy
discussed in the Rhetorica ad Herennium, his strategies contradict these sources.
Hirst instructs those who write technical instructions to use cartoon images to
enhance their readers' recall of information. These cartoon images toy with the
physical properties of objects, thereby exaggerating cartoons even more. For
example, to create an image for tuning an engine, the cartoon might show a man
drawn much smaller than a car engine handling an enormous and angry spark
plug. (Thi s s ame strategy w a s used by the Pentagon in the 1 95 0 s when i t
enlisted Will Eisner ' s talents t o prepare comic books for soldiers t o train them
in auto mechanics.)
Hirst's use of mental imaging falls short of both classical and contemporary
strategies. First, one essential element of the classical mnemonic is the idiosyn
cratic nature of the image; for the image to be recalled, persons storing the image
must create their own image. According to the author of the Rhetorica Ad
Herennium ( 1 954):
Often in fact when we declare that one form resembles another, we
fail to receive universal assent, because things seem different to
different persons. The same i s true with respect to images: one that
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is well-defined to us appears relatively inconspicuous to others .
Everybody, therefore, should in equipping himself with images suit
his own convenience. (p. 223)
Hirst's treatment of images echoes the medieval creation of stock images and
reinforces the historical marginalizing of the image.
Although Hirst's treatment of the image does not coincide with the classical
mnemonic system, his modern, technical version does mimic a strategy used in
constructing "emblem" books of the early Renaissance (Freeman, 1 970; Lechner,
1 962; Thompson, 1 924). These books used a text to exemplify a woodcut that
v i su ally represented a v i rtue or vice, teaching a les son both v isually and
verbally. Problems arose, however, in producing emblem books due to new and
often faulty technology. The woodcuts that the emblematic texts were meant to
gloss were difficult and expensive to produce; therefore, it became routine for
printers to use whatever woodcut they had on hand. Rather than create text and
image, authors of emblem books chose to write texts to match the available
woodcuts. This practice resulted in a kind of seventeenth-century clip art, wherein
often inappropriate images were used as a gloss on texts. The image became
secondary to the text, functioning as an ornament rather than as the subject of the
l e s s o n and the means by which the l e s s o n w a s effectively learne d . T h i s
standardization of the image relegated it t o a secondary status, mirroring again
its position as less valuable than verbal representations.
Today, the difference between emblem books and mental imagery echoes the
polarization between pictorialists and descriptionalists by refocusing attention
on their competing status. Which is predominant? Which has more validity, more
integrity? Are mental images real pictures (Platonic embodiments of the thing
itself) or are the pictures simply metaphors, constructed from v isually powerful
terms to articulate ideas? Can researchers develop tests that measure whether
subj ects are translating v isual images into external pictures , or trans lating
picture images into words, or combining these two operations in some way? Can
we answer the philosophical question of which comes first, the image or the word?
(Finke, 1 989; Rollins, 1 989).
In contemporary writing pedagogy we must be aware of the complexities
implicit in the use of mental imagery and of the problematic history that sur
rounds it. But more important, we need to consider how mental imagery can help
writer create texts, how mental imagery reinforces the way writers arrange texts,
and most difficult perhaps, how readers of texts use mental imagery to enhance
their understanding of, their enj oyment of, and their use of those texts. The ways
in which we discuss mental imagery in our discipline should not further divide
us into those who fit the mainstream and those who are peripheral to it.
And although w e need to study the psychological proce s s es i n mental
imagery, we need to remind ourselves that this work i s not without limitations.
Not only must we consider the cultural interferences Richardson warns us of, but
we also need to be aware of the mechanization of the mental image. Prominent
cognitive psychologist, Geoffrey Loftus ( 1 989), alludes to these limitations when
he says, "Computer simulations are seducing us away from doing real creative
thinking in the behavioral sciences" (as cited in Finke, p. 145). Even today we

Calendrillo/Mental Imagery, Psychology, and Rhetoric

79

fall into the trap that beset the late emblem authors. Current psychological work
in mental imagery constructs computer simulations. It attempts to pinpoint the
relationship between mental and physical images and discusses them in technical
vocabulary that mimics the mechanical. Even Kosslyn and Shwartz's ( 1 977) model
of mental images, which arises from a pictorialist view, describes mental images
as having scanning, zooming, and rotating computer-like properties. Though we
cannot deny this view of imaging, we must not be seduced by it, away from the
creative thinking we need to make mental imagery a valuable part of composi
tion theory and practice. cQj
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